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Hot topics: Education Work at 11KBW in February 2013

March 12th, 2013 by Paul Greatorex

February 2013 saw judgment delivered in the GCSE judicial review in which three of the four parties were represented by a total of seven members of 11KBW. But away from the headlines, February was a busy month for the education law team at 11KBW and the following is an indication of the type and range of work done.

In the higher education sector, members have been involved in a number of cases involving complaints by students which have taken different forms: internal complaints, complaints to the OIA, contract claims and a challenge by way of judicial review. The greater legal scrutiny being given to the contractual relationship between students and universities is evident with particular questions being asked about the impact of fee caps on such contracts and whether the scope of the duties imposed by one such contract extended to addressing a student’s dyslexia. The cross-over with members’ expertise in employment cases continues to be valuable with advice being sought from a higher education institution on collective redundancy arrangements. The new freedoms given to FE/HE colleges by the Education Act 2011 are also to the fore.

Academies continue to generate legal disputes with a number of members being asked to advise in this area, including questions about the powers of the Secretary of State in relation to “free schools” and the problematic issues that often arise over the sale/transfer of playing fields when a school converts to an Academy. Advice was also sought more generally on central government’s powers to intervene in the education functions of a local authority.

In the field of special educational needs advice has been sought on two forthcoming changes: the new funding arrangements for children with SEN and the draft Inter-authority Recoupment (England) Regulations 2013. In relation to the former advice has also been sought on the pilot scheme for direct payments. Members also continue to be involved in appeals against statements of SEN, often in the most complex and high-value cases where there is a dispute about whether a residential school is needed, as well on appeals to the Upper Tribunal. There are also cases in the disability discrimination field, including a substantive challenge and a case about costs.

Issues which have arisen in the field of admissions include advice sought from selective schools in this regard as well as the question of whether the School Admissions Code enables schools to give priority to children who attend linked nursery provision.

To end where this round-up began, qualifications continue to feature in work done with advice having been sought on the meaning and effect of certain parts of Ofqual’s Qualifications and Credit Framework.

School transport guidance

March 11th, 2013 by Rachel Kamm

The Department for Education has published new statutory guidance on home to school travel and transport. This 10 page document helpfully summarises the various statutory duties and there is a flowchart of the review and appeal processes.

Rachel Kamm

School Capital Funding

March 6th, 2013 by Rachel Kamm

Those of you who have followed the progress of  Building Schools for the Future and the Priority Schools Building programme, may be interested in the latest announcement about capital funding for schools.  Mr Gove has made a Ministerial statement about capital funding of around £4billion that will be made available to create new school places and to carry out maintenance and repair work to existing school buildings. The Department explains that the announcement includes details on the allocation of:

  • £1.6 billion of basic need funding for 2013-15 to local authorities to provide additional school places where needed in their area;
  • •£595 million of maintenance capital for 2013-14 to local authorities to support the needs of the schools that they maintain and for the Sure Start children’s centres in their area;
  • •£392 million of maintenance capital for academies for 2013-14;
  • •£154 million of locally-coordinated VA programme capital for 2013-14 to support the maintenance capital needs of voluntary-aided schools;
  • •£200 million of devolved formula capital for schools;
  • • a total of £65 million for sixth-form college maintenance and devolved formula capital funding for 2013-14, and £80 million basic need funding for 16 to 19 demographic pressures for 2013-15; and
  • • a total of £15 million funding for Independent Specialist Providers (ISPs) for 2013-15.

Information is also now available about:

  • applications for the Targeted Basic Need programme, for funding for local authorities in England to build high quality new Academy and Free schools on their own sites and to permanently expand existing good and outstanding Academies and maintained schools (deadline noon on 30 April 2013);

Rachel Kamm

11KBW Seminar on the Children and Families Bill

March 5th, 2013 by Jonathan Moffett

On Monday 4th March 2013, 11KBW hosted an evening seminar to discuss the provisions in the new Children and Families Bill relating to special educational needs.

The Bill was introduced into Parliament on 4 February and had its second reading on 25 February. Part 3 of the Bill, entitled “Children and Young People in England with Special Educational Needs” will, if enacted, be the first major legislative intervention in the field of special educational needs in England since Part 4 of the Education Act 1996 came into force.

The seminar was chaired by Clive Sheldon QC and the speakers were Jonathan Moffett and Joanne Clement. Jonathan presented a paper on the provisions in the Bill imposing general duties on local authorities, health sector bodies, and other public bodies. Joanne presented a paper on the provisions that will govern how cases of individual children with special educational needs are to be dealt with. The papers are available on the 11KBW website click here.

Protecting the reputation of schools and universities

February 22nd, 2013 by Paul Greatorex

You can say what you like about local authorities – and people do, knowing that the authority itself (as opposed to any individual member or employee) cannot sue in defamation. This was first established back in 1891 in Manchester Corporation v Williams [1891] 1 Q.B. 94, where it was held that the council could not complain about a letter to a newspaper alleging that “bribery and corruption have existed and done their nefarious work” in a number of its departments.

Although there were subsequently conflicting decisions, the modern position was confirmed by the House of Lords in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534, which is often cited for the proposition that local authorities do not have a reputation that they are entitled to protect.

Two recent attempts to extend that proposition to schools and universities have been rejected by the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the High Court respectively.

In Hill v Great Tey Primary School (judgment here) a dinner lady told a child’s parents that their daughter had been tied to a fence and whipped with a skipping rope by some other pupils, and subsequently repeated that to the press. An employment tribunal found that her dismissal for breach of confidentiality and acting in a manner likely to bring the school into disrepute was procedurally unfair but reduced her compensation on the grounds of Polkey and for contributory fault.

On appeal against the remedy decision only, it was argued that the disclosures made were protected by the right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was accepted that right can be qualified by the aim of protecting the reputation of others, but argued that on the basis of Derbyshire the school, as public body, did not have a reputation it could protect.

The EAT (Langstaff J presiding) rejected this argument, pointing out that the decision in Derbyshire does not apply to all public bodies and further that a school was not a governmental body and was not political. Moreover, said the EAT, a school’s reputation:

“is a matter of importance – in the case of a small primary school in attracting staff, and children. In these days of parental choice, state schools are in competition to secure funding by admitting pupils.”

The tribunal had found that “the speaking out of a member of staff in an uncontrolled way failed to ensure that the flow of information from the school was managed sensibly in such a way as to protect any pupil who might be seen by a parent or another pupil as a transgressor”. The EAT said this showed that the tribunal had in mind “not the interests of an inanimate public institution but the real children, staff and parents who populated and frequented it”.

Meanwhile in Duke v University of Salford [2013] EWHC 196 (QB) (judgment here) the university had sued the author of an internet blog for defamation. The postings complained about included an unfavourable comparison between the university and the leadership of Hezbollah, and a suggestion that the university was “adopting some of the more odious policies of the great Chinese bureaucratic dictatorship”.

Eady J expressed surprise at hearing the submission that a university is not entitled to sue in defamation to protect its reputation, and referred to earlier cases to the contrary which had distinguished Derbyshire on the basis that universities are not an organ of government. The judge said that any public policy decision that universities should not have a right to bring such claims could only be for Parliament, or perhaps the Supreme Court.

Nonetheless, Eady J struck out the claim on the basis that the criticisms were really about individuals, any damage to the university was purely incidental, and the litigation was “not worth the candle” since any damage to the university would not be effectively vindicated so long as the allegations against the individuals remained in the air. The judge said it was conceivable that an action by those individuals referred to (who were not claimants) could be supported by university funds but that was an internal matter.

Paul Greatorex

The duty to give former looked after children assistance with education

February 19th, 2013 by Rachel Kamm

The High Court has found in R (Kebede) v Newcastle City Council that local authorities have a duty (and not a discretion) to make a grant in relation to educational expenses and that this could include a grant for tuition fees.

The two claimant brothers were former relevant children for the purposes of sections 23B and 23C of the Children Act 1989 i.e. they were over eighteen and (a) had been looked after by the local authority up until their 18th birthday or (b) they had been looked after by the local authority for a prescribed period when they were 16 and/or 17. They wanted to go to university, but were ineligible for student loans because they were not British citizens (although they had discretionary leave to remain in the UK). They asked the local authority to assist under section 23C of the Children Act 1989, which included provision that the local authority had a duty to give them assistance by making a grant to enable them to meet expenses connected to their education, to the extent that their educational needs required it.

The local authority refused to assist the brothers, arguing that it had a discretion to assist but that, in any event, it only had a power to assist with expenses connected with education and this did not include a student loan. The Court rejected both of these arguments.

Mr Timothy Straker QC held that there was a duty on the local authority to make a grant to the extent that a former relevant child’s educational needs required it. Further, that grant could include tuition fees; a principal expense associated with education was the cost of tuition. The judge also rejected an argument that it was relevant that the local authority had limited resources. Having allowed the claim, he refused to make a mandatory order requiring the local authority to make a grant to the brothers.  Instead, the decision was quashed and a fresh decision is to be made in light of the judgment, with the local authority deciding whether or not the brothers’ educational needs require the grant.

The judgment is not available as yet.

Rachel Kamm

Judicial review of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education; non-material error of fact; failure to exhaust internal procedures

February 14th, 2013 by Jane Oldham

While the OIA is amenable to judicial review, the courts will generally be very slow to interfere with its decisions, and where an inferior tribunal has made an error of fact, relief by way of judicial review will only be granted if the error is material. Mostyn J identified and applied these principles when dismissing a challenge to the OIA’s decision that the LSE had not been required to publish either the marking scheme or the assessment criteria for an examination which the Claimant had failed.

The LSE’s rules stated that it was required to publish assessment criteria for the course. The Claimant complained, internally, of the failure to publish a “marking scheme”. That complaint was dismissed on internal appeal. He complained to the OIA that the LSE had failed to publish “assessment criteria”. The OIA held that the LSE had not been required to publish “assessment criteria or marking schemes”.

Mostyn J held that there was a clear distinction between the LSE’s marking scheme, which  essentially set out model answers to the examination questions, and its assessment criteria, which were indicators of the standard needed for a student to achieve particular grades in that examination and which did not describe the syllabus or the scope or subject matter of the course.

The OIA had erred in conflating the marking scheme and assessment criteria, and had therefore erred in holding that the LSE was not required by its rules to publish assessment criteria. However, that error was not material, as publication of the assessment criteria could not have made any difference to the Claimant’s performance in his examination.

Further, the OIA was likely to have held, had she appreciated the distinction between the marking scheme and the assessment criteria, that the Claimant had failed to exhaust his internal remedies in relation to publication of assessment criteria, as his internal complaint had concerned the marking scheme.

Accordingly if the OIA was directed to reconsider the complaint, Mostyn J was in no doubt that it would be dismissed.

Accordingly the application for judicial review was dismissed.

R (Burger) v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2013] EWHC 172 (Admin)

GCSE judicial review dismissed

February 13th, 2013 by Rachel Kamm

The Divisional Court has dismissed the claims for judicial review of the award of GCSE English qualifications in summer 2012.

Giving judgment after the rolled-up hearing held shortly before Christmas, the Court granted permission to bring judicial review proceedings, stating that the issue had been one of widespread and genuine concern, but rejected the substantive claims.

Members of 11KBW represented the Claimants (Clive Sheldon QC, Joanne Clement and Joseph Barrett) and both of the awarding organisations who were joined as defendants (Clive Lewis QC and Jane Oldham for AQA; Nigel Giffin QC and Christopher Knight for Edexcel).  The other defendant was Ofqual.  Peter Oldham QC of 11KBW advised OCR, another awarding organisation who were named as an interested party.

The Court analysed the decision-making process in detail.  It concluded that the defendants had not given improper weight to statistical material predicting the proportion of candidates who should achieve C grades, and had not fettered their discretion.  With hindsight, the grading of students who took the assessments in January 2012 had been too generous, but that did not require the June 2012 cohort to be treated in the same way.  Ofqual was entitled to take the view that priority should be given to ensuring that standards were consistent year on year, and the awarding organisations could not ignore that.  There were no assurances about grade boundaries remaining constant between assessment dates, nor any consistent past practice, such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation.  Although the difference in treatment between the January and June cohorts required justification, such justification was held to have been clearly established, in circumstances where any unfairness between the January and June cohorts could not be remedied without creating further unfairness elsewhere.  The approach taken by the defendants was one which was properly open to them.

However, the Court rejected the suggestion that the decisions of the awarding organisations were not amenable to judicial review at all.  Nor, on the facts of the case, did the possibility of intervention by Ofqual represent an alternative remedy that should have been pursued in preference to judicial review.

The Court’s judgment contains a discussion of “conspicuous unfairness” as a ground of challenge in judicial review.  It holds that, whilst it is ultimately for the court to decide whether the decision-maker has abused its power by acting in a way which is conspicuously unfair, that does not give the court a wide discretion to substitute its own view of the substantive merits.  Rather, conspicuous unfairness should be seen as a particular form of irrationality.  It may be the best description for a complaint based on a sudden change of policy or inconsistent treatment, but judicial review will lie only if a reasonable body could not fairly have acted as the defendant did.

Finally, an argument based upon the public sector equality duty was also rejected by the Court, on the footing that equality implications could have no bearing upon the assessment of performance and the setting of grade boundaries (as opposed to e.g. fixing curricula and setting examination papers).

Consequential issues, including any application for permission to appeal, have been postponed to a later date.

Education Provision and Planning Permission

February 8th, 2013 by James Goudie QC

A private educational institution operated from premises which it did not have planning permission to use for educational purposes.  The Home Secretary revoked its A-rated Sponsor Licence under the Immigration Points Based System.  In  R (School of Business and Commerce Limited) v SSHD [2013] EWHC 126 (Admin) the Court dismissed the institution’s judicial review challenge to the revocation of the Licence.  The UKBA was entitled to regard the unlawful use of premises as a very serious matter.  The Judge observed that Colleges like that provided by the School meet important public policy criteria. They are an important part of the UK’s role in the wider world, bringing in foreign funds by providing skills and training to students from many countries. On completion of their studies, students in most cases return to their country of origin to deploy those skills, often in developing countries where they will prove of great value. Some remain in the UK as significant parts of the workforce here. The reputation of higher education facilities in the UK is strong. It is an implicit assumption that all prospective and actual students can make that they enter a lawfully run institution working from premises in which they are entitled to operate. SSHD’s decision on the planning issue was reasonably within her discretion. 

 There was also an issue about information concerning the attendance record of the students.  The information provided was incorrect.  Enquiries revealed that the non-attendance rate was high.  The Judge observed that, in order to maintain trust and sound policy application, it is essential for colleges to provide the Defendant with full and accurate information when UKBA is assessing whether there has been compliance with sponsor duties. The decision to revoke the sponsor licence was reasonable as a result of the failures in that respect. The decision on that ground was certainly within the discretion of the SSHD.

School severely criticised for discriminating against disabled pupil

February 5th, 2013 by Paul Greatorex

The First-tier Tribunal has upheld a claim of disability discrimination against Stanbridge Earls, an independent school in Hampshire, making very serious criticisms of the school and far-reaching orders by way of remedy. The tribunal found the school failed to protect a vulnerable disabled pupil who was a victim of sexual abuse by male pupils at the school. Amongst other remedies, the tribunal ordered that a redacted copy of its decision be sent to the Secretary of State for Education to consider whether the school should continue to be registered, as well as to Ofsted, Hampshire County Council’s Director of Children’s Services and all local authorities which have named or are known to be considering naming the school in part 4 of a statement. The tribunal also expressed the view that the school should not advertise its ability to make appropriate provision for children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder while it lacks the necessary professional expertise, leadership, management, training, and systems to meet those needs and ensure that such children are not discriminated against unlawfully.

Parents and local authorities who may be considering a placement at the school should therefore be aware of this decision, although of course it remains to be seen whether any of the tribunal’s findings are challenged by way of appeal.

For coverage of this on the BBC News website see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-21129310 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-21173180.